

Explaining Regional Differences in Environmental Inequality

A Multi-Level Assessment of German Cities

Tobias Rüttenauer


Department of Social Sciences
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Analytische Soziologie
Venice

Aim of this study

Environmental inequality in Germany


- Foreign-minorities are affected by disproportionately high amount of environmental pollution



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
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Environmental inequality in Germany

- Foreign-minorities are affected by disproportionately high amount of environmental pollution



⇒ How can we explain this variation between the cities?

Theoretical Mechanisms

Selective siting

- Lower political protest of minorities
 - Lower land / housing prices where minorities live
- ⇒ Facilities are sited close to minorities

Selective migration

- Socio-economic resources
 - Housing discrimination
- ⇒ Minorities move into polluted areas

(Campbell et al., 2015; Crowder and Downey, 2010; Mohai and Saha, 2015)

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Between-city variation

Selective siting

- Political efficacy of majority group
- Residential segregation

Selective migration

- Economic inequality (minority vs. majority)
- Residential segregation

But:

- Do a poor job of explaining environmental inequality (Downey, 2007)
 - Studies 'fail to take the spatial distribution of environmental hazards within metropolitan areas into account' (Downey, 2007, p. 970)
- See also Downey (2005); Elliott and Frickel (2015)

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
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Low Environmental Inequality

Gelsenkirchen

In Air Pollution




% Foreigners




Hannover

In Air Pollution



% Foreigners




△ Facility location ✕ City centre

- ⇒ Minorities cluster around the city centre
- ⇒ Pollution occurs far from the city centre


High Environmental Inequality

Chemnitz

In Air Pollution




% Foreigners




Erlangen

In Air Pollution



% Foreigners



△ Facility location ⊗ City centre

⇒ Minorities cluster around the city centre

⇒ Pollution occurs close to the centre

Data

German census 2011

- 1 km² grid over 79 German cities ($\geq 100,000$ inhabitants)
- Final sample: 9,061 grid cells
- Average number of inhabitants: 2,650 (median: 1,717)
- Predictor variable: % foreigners
- Main controls: Population density, % vacant housing

E-PRTR


- Industrial facilities exceeding a pollutant-specific threshold
- 366 facilities reporting industrial emissions to air within cities
- Response variable: industrial air pollution (ln kg)

Merging Strategy

Proportional Overlap

- 2 km buffer around facility location
- Overlap of buffer and census cell
- Allocation proportionate to overlap

(e.g. Banzhaf and Walsh, 2008)



City level variables

INKAR 2011

- Economic Inequality: Unemployment ratio (non-Germans/Germans)
- Political efficacy: Voter turnout

Segregation

- Spatial information theory index \tilde{H}_{2000} (Reardon and O'Sullivan, 2004)

Facility centrality

$$FC_i = \left(\frac{\frac{1}{M} \sum_{j=1}^M d_{ij}}{\max(\tilde{\mathbf{d}}_i)} \right)^{-1},$$

where d_{ij} is the distance between each facility $j = 1, \dots, M$ in the 2km surrounding of city i and the city's centre, and $\tilde{\mathbf{d}}_i$ a vector of the distances between the city centre and all coordinates of the city's boundary.

Method


City-fixed effects multi-level model

- First level: within-city correlation
- Random slope: variation of within-effect between cities
- Parameter of interest: cross-level interaction


$$pollution_{ij} = \beta_{0j} + \beta_1 forgn_{ij} + \beta_2 forgn_{ij} segr_j + u_{1j} forgn_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij},$$

for all $i = 1, \dots, N$ observations and $j = 1, \dots, J$ cities. This is achieved by within-group demeaning the data (Enders and Tofighi, 2007) and estimating a multilevel random-slope model.


Dependent variable: In Pollution




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
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
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
Dependent variable: In Pollution




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What does it mean?

1) Confounding mechanism

- Process 1: Minorities cluster in central cities
 - Process 2: High pollution in inner cities
- ⇒ Two independent processes

2) Mediating mechanism

- Facilities are centrally sited *because* minority share is high
 - Minorities cluster in inner city *because* pollution is high
- ⇒ Causal mechanism of selective siting or migration?

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Dependent variable: facility centrality

	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5
Centralization index ^a	0.021 (0.114)				0.215 (0.158)
\tilde{H}_{2000}		-0.103 (0.113)			-0.178 (0.148)
Unemployment ratio			0.295** (0.109)		0.208 [†] (0.122)
Voter turnout				0.243* (0.111)	0.190 (0.136)
R ²	0.000	0.011	0.087	0.059	0.130
Adj. R ²	-0.013	-0.002	0.075	0.047	0.083
Num. obs.	79	79	79	79	79

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, [†] $p < 0.1$. All variables are centered around their mean and scaled by their standard deviation. Standard errors in parentheses.

^a Relative Centralization Index (RCE) as described in Massey and Denton (1988): proximity of the foreign population to the city centre relative to the proximity of the German population to the city centre.

Conclusion

Causal mechanisms of environmental inequality

- Challenges the importance of selective siting and migration
- Magnitude driven by centrality of minorities and pollution
- Independence of facility centrality and minority centrality?

Campbell et al. (2015)

- Simulations don't reach a realistic level of environmental inequality when just assuming selective siting and migration

Limitations

- ⇒ Only industrial air pollution
- ⇒ Only 'proxies' of selective siting & migration
- ⇒ Results are only descriptive
- ⇒ (Social) mechanism?

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Thank you very much!

- Banzhaf, H. S. and Walsh, R. P. (2008). Do people vote with their feet? An empirical test of Tiebout's mechanism. *American Economic Review*, 98(3):843–863.
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

Summary Statistics

Table: Summary Statistics



Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
In Air pollution	9,061	4.02	6.65	0.00	20.93
% Foreigners	9,061	9.00	8.43	0.00	87.10
Population	9,061	2,649.91	2,887.97	3.00	23,379.00
% 65 and older	9,061	20.57	7.44	0.00	99.60
% Vacant housing	9,061	3.50	3.54	0.00	60.00
Living space (m ²)	9,061	41.74	5.95	11.00	95.90
\tilde{H}_{2000}	79	0.03	0.01	0.01	0.08
\tilde{D}_{2000}	79	0.17	0.05	0.08	0.30
Unemployment ratio	79	2.34	0.37	1.28	3.43
Voter turnout	79	69.18	3.75	60.10	77.10
Facility centrality	79	2.78	2.18	0.00	17.78

Berlin

Air pollution (In kg)



% Foreigners




Multilevel-Models

	M4	M5	M6
Census cell level			
% Foreigners	0.232*** (0.034)	0.254*** (0.037)	0.245*** (0.031)
Cross-level interactions			
% Foreigners $\times \tilde{H}_{2000}$		0.079 [†] (0.048)	0.086* (0.040)
% Foreigners \times Unemployment ratio		-0.010 (0.032)	-0.046 (0.028)
% Foreigners \times Voter turnout		0.044 (0.037)	0.024 (0.032)
% Foreigners \times Facility centrality			0.139*** (0.026)
Fixed effects	yes	yes	yes
Random slope	yes	yes	yes
AIC	23635.200	23680.777	23672.149
N	9061	9061	9061
N cluster	79	79	79
σ^2 % Foreigners	0.066	0.068	0.044
σ^2 Residual	0.780	0.780	0.780

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, [†] $p < 0.1$. Multilevel models with group centered first level variables. All variables are scaled by their standard deviation. Standard errors in parentheses. Controls: Population, % 65 and older, % Vacant housing, Living space.

Dependent variable: In Pollution (tox-weighted)



Spatial Model

