Conspuracy Theories in the Lab

1

Alexander Libman

LMU Munich

(joint work with Loukas Balafoutas, Björn Vollan and Vasileios Selamis)

Conspiracy	https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/04/12-million-americans-believe-lizard-people-run-our-country/316706/	Percent believing	Number of Americans believing
JFK was killed	d by conspiracy	51 percent	160,096,160
Bush intention	nally misled on Iraq WMDs	44 percent	138,122,178
Global warmir	ng is a hoax	37 percent	116,148,195
Aliens exist		29 percent	91,035,072
New World Or	der	28 percent	87,895,931
Hussein was involved in 9/11		28 percent	87,895,931
A UFO crashed at Roswell		21 percent	65,921,948
Vaccines are linked to autism		20 percent	62,782,808
The government controls minds with TV		15 percent	47,087,106
Medical industry invents diseases		15 percent	47,087,106
CIA developed	d crack	14 percent	43,947,966
Bigfoot exists		14 percent	43,947,966
Obama is the Antichrist		13 percent	40,808,825
The governme	ent allowed 9/11	11 percent	34,530,544
Fluoride is da	ngerous	9 percent	28,252,264
The moon land	ding was faked	7 percent	21,973,983
Bin Laden is a	alive	6 percent	18,834,842
Airplane contrails are sinister chemicals		5 percent	15,695,702
McCartney died in 1966		5 percent	15,695,702
Lizard people control politics		4 percent	12,556,562

Motivation

"The truth is out there!"

- Three main elements of conspiracy thinking
 - Intentional action
 - Malicious intent
 - Hidden action
- Extremely widespread as the explanation for the (complex) observed characteristics of the world
- Some research on conspiracy thinking, establishing that it has an effect
 - Mostly immediate consequences of belief in specific conspiracy theories (survey experiments) or correlates between conspiracy thinking and other aspects of behavior / personality (observational data)
- Problems
 - More complex consequences of conspiracy thinking: not about belief in certain facts, but about certain way of interpreting the (social) reality
 - Conspiracy theorists believe in contradictory theories at the same time!
 - Belief in conspiracies = Belief in "weird things"??
 - Most studies: Exposure to conspiracy theories → Belief in conspiracy theories → Behavioral consequences. Is it really so?

Contribution

This paper

- A laboratory experiment
- Conspiracy priming
- Consequences of conspiracy priming in an environment *unrelated* to it
- General behavioral characteristics:
 - Trust (a frequently found correlate of belief in conspiracies)
 - Strategic sophistication
- Attempt to explicitly uncover whether effect of conspiracy treatment goes ,through' conspiracy beliefs

Findings

- Conspiracy priming has an effect on human behavior, but
- It does not affect trust
- It does increase strategic sophistication
- Priming increases belief in conspiracy, but its behavioral consequences are not mediated by this belief

Design

General characteristics

- N = 144
- Student subjects, University of Innsbruck
- Two randomly assigned treatments
 - A short video with a sympathetic account of the Moon hoax (a widespread conspiracy belief in the US context, rather unimportant in the German context)
 - An equally long video on space exploration (space shuttle program)
- Incentivized responding to informational questions reveals no differences in the difficulty level across videos
- Two games played in random order
 - Trust game
 - Beauty contest game

Games

Trust game

- Pairs of A and B (no communication, no repeated interaction...)
 - A receives 5 €
 - A can transfer a portion of it to B
 - The transferred portion is multiplied by 3
 - B can transfer some of this money back to A
- How much does A transfer?

Beauty contest

- Pairs of A and B (no communication, no repeated interaction...)
 - A and B are asked to bid an integer between 5 and 14 €
 - The participant with the smaller bid receives the bid plus $10 \in$
 - The participant with the larger bid receives just the bid
 - Ask respondents why did they select a certain bid
- Proxy of strategic sophistication (k-level thinking)

Main results

	Primed group	Control group	Δ
Moon landing	2.736	1.972	0.764***
	(0.148)	(0.140)	(0.204)
Princess Diana	1.958	1.861	0.097
	(0.123)	(0.118)	(0.170)
Pharmaceuticals	3.361	3.125	0.236
	(0.146)	(0.149)	(0.209)
Roswell	1.444	1.361	0.083
	(0.103)	(0.089)	(0.136)
9/11	2.472	2.333	0.139
	(0.163)	(0.147)	(0.219)
k-level reasoning	1.738	1.281	0.456**
	(0.117)	(0.136)	(0.180)
Trust level	3.278	2.944	-0.334
	(0.332)	(0.333)	(0.471)

Causal mediation analysis

Conspiracy priming

- Increases beliefs in conspiracy thinking
- Increases strategic sophistication
- How does the causal structure look like?

Causal mediation analysis

	Effect	[95% Confidence Interval]	
Indirect effect	-0.002	-0.140	0.127
Direct effect	0.460	0.076	0.813
Total effect	0.458	0.077	0.814

Essentially, not the effect of conspiracy beliefs, but of mere exposure to conspiracy ideas!

Mediators

Effects could be conditional on subjects' characteristics

- Not so much in our sample
 - A variation of the frequently criticized WEIRD sample
- One variable, which matters, is potentially religiosity
 - Also relies on hidden intentional explanations (but less on malicious intent)
 - Substitute or a strengthening factor?
 - Affects interest to the topic we prime
 - We cannot ask about it explicitly before experiment, or we will bias our results!!
- Findings (dif-in-dif)
 - Belief in Moon hoax increases in particular for less religious subjects
 - K-level thinking increases in particular for *more religious subjects*
 - In any case, effects significant for a sufficiently large portion of the sample
 - Effects on beliefs: religion as a substitute?
 - Effects on k-level thinking: lower familiarity with the subject promoting stronger response?

Summary

Main findings

- Exposure to conspiracy theories
 - Does increase beliefs in conspiracies
 - But also has other important effects
- Exposure to conspiracy theories increases strategic sophistication
 - What does it mean for human interaction?
 - At least not a simple ,negative' effect often posited by the literature
- Effect on trust reported in many observational studies not causal

Limitations

- Very short-term exposure to a conspiracy theory: we need more time to really elicit beliefs
- Maybe other conspiracy theories could work differently in Austrian samples?
 - But, again, our study is about conspiracy thinking, not about (specific) conspiracy theories

One slide on the second study

Experimental game instead of an experiment

- Chinese and Russian subjects in Moscow and in Beijing
- Explicitly asking them whether they believe in certain types of conspiracies (in particular, Western-induced conspiracies)
 - No causal identification
 - Experimental game to elicit incentive-induced behavior
- Game: do people expect others to cooperate against them
 - Three-person games: two subjects bid for a good offered by the third subject
 - Communication: bidders can form a coalition against the seller
 - Seller can invite one or two bidders (for a fee): expectation of collusion → save the fee and invite only one bidder
 - Russians: coalitions rarely formed, promises frequently disregarded
 - Chinese: more coalition formation, subjects rarely break promises
 - In the Chinese sample: anti-Western conspiracy beliefs correlated (!) with lower expectation of collusion by the seller
 - In-group thinking!
 - Conspiracy thinking has more complex implications than frequently believed!